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Stephen John Currier, through his

volunteer counsel, submits the following Reply Brief, in addition
to the arguments and authorities previously presented:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP KQI^S
The relevant text of any constitutional provisions, statutes or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues in this appeal is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This is the second appeal from the dismissal of PetitionerAppellant's post-conviction petition on procedural grounds.

The

district court has twice refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the merits of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Relief, which includes claims that:

trial counsel

provided

ineffective assistance due to the use of undue and

wrongful

pressure

to

plead

guilty;

trial

counsel

provided

ineffective assistance due to an undisclosed conflict of interest
in concurrently representing the co-defendant in the case; trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate

the case and introduce evidence; and

important

incriminating

statements had been recanted.
Petitioner-Appellant Stephen John Currier was charged in
Carbon County, Utah with sexual abuse of a child, a first degree
felony.

On October 3, 1988, Mr. Currier pleaded guilty to the

lesser charge of sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony.
(R. 142-47; 224-27).

Mr. Currier's appointed lawyer was Mark

Tanner, who also represented co-defendant Raymond Marquez.

(R.

149).
On November 30, 1988, trial counsel filed a Verified Motion
to Change Plea, on the basis that his investigation following entry
of the plea indicated that Mr. Currier was innocent.

(R. 149-52).

Trial counsel relied in part upon statements of his other client,
co-defendant Marquez.
Mr. Currier's Motion to Change Plea was denied after a
brief1 non-evidentiary hearing on January 3, 1989.

(R. 154). At

the hearing, trial counsel stated that:
I believe it was my pressure that brought the
Defendant to enter a plea, even though he stated
in his written statement that he did it
voluntarily. I believe he did it under pressure
exerted by counsel, and I think at this point it
was undue pressure, and it was wrongful pressure;
and I should not have indicated to him or so
advised him.

1

The transcript of the January 3, 1989 hearing contains less
than four pages of proceedings, consisting of statements from the
trial counsel, the prosecutor and the court. (R.228-33).
2

(R. 229),

The trial court ruled that the guilty plea had been

voluntarily entered, because counsel had failed to present facts to
show that Mr. Currier "didn't know what he was doing." (R. 231).
Immediately prior to sentencing on April 3, 1989, trial
counsel renewed the motion to withdraw Mr. Currier's guilty plea,
again stating that he had been wrong in advising Mr. Currier to
enter the plea.

(R. 22, 23).

The district court denied that

request, and denied leave to take an interlocutory appeal.

(R.

29).
Mr. Currier was sentenced to a term of one to 15 years in
the Utah State Prison. The court suspended the prison sentence and
placed Mr. Currier on probation for 18 months, with the condition
that he serve six months in the Carbon County Jail and 18 months on
probation.

(R. 157).

Mr. Currier's Notice of Appeal from the denial of his plea
withdrawal motion was timely filed on April 19, 1989. (R. 160-61).
The Docketing Statement submitted in the direct appeal stated that
the issues to be raised were the voluntariness of the guilty plea
and the refusal to allow the plea withdrawal "when counsel for
Defendant indicated that perhaps too much pressure had been applied
to Defendant to encourage him to enter the guilty plea, and when
new evidence and information was discovered regarding statements
given by state witnesses."

(R. 47).

On June 7 and June 9, 1989, trial counsel filed in the
district court and in this Court, respectively, affidavits executed
January 27, 1989 by two persons who heard the alleged victim deny
3

that Mr. Currier had sexually assaulted her. (R. 163-67). On June
21, 1989, counsel filed a Motion for Review, requesting the
district court to decrease Mr. Currier's jail sentence to three
months.

(R. 169). After a hearing on the same date, the court

entered the following Order, stating in pertinent part that:
That it will amend the judgment previously entered
that a condition of the probation be that
defendant served 90 days in jail.
The time
already served will do with the condition that the
appeal to the Court of Appeals be dismissed. The
defendant will be released from custody upon
showing that the motion to dismiss the appeal has
been filed.
(R. 172).
Trial counsel immediately complied with this condition, by
filing a Motion to Dismiss in this Court on the same day.
177).

(R.

The Motion to Dismiss and its supporting Affidavit, (R.

174), stated that the prosecution had agreed to recommend the
waiver of Mr. Currier's additional jail term "in exchange for the
dismissal ... of this appeal"2 and the execution of a blanket
release of claims against Carbon County and the State.
175,177).

(R.

Later that day, this Court dismissed Mr. Currier's

appeal and issued the remittitur.

2

(R. 180).

The State is incorrect in asserting in its Statement of
Facts that, in dismissing his appeal, Mr. Currier knew "he was
relinquishing all rights to litigate the merits of his claim."
(Brief of Appellee, at 6) (Emphasis added). The Affidavit signed
by Mr. Currier actually states that he was waiving "all rights to
appeal the merits of his claim."
(R.175) (Emphasis added).
Litigation of postconviction claims pursuant to Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is separate from the direct appeal
process authorized by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4

Mr. Currier was released from custody on June 26, 1989.
(R. 185). On July 1, 1991, the trial court revoked his probation
and ordered him to begin serving the prison sentence originally
imposed.

(R. 193). In November 1991, Mr. Currier received a copy

of an affidavit executed by co-defendant Raymond Marquez, recanting
statements

incriminating him.

Mr. Currier

immediately

began

preparing a post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3

Mr. Currier's Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus and Post-conviction Relief was filed on April 16,
1992.

(R. 2).
In response, the State argued that the Petition should be

dismissed because Mr. Currier had not complied with the filing
deadline set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992).

The

trial court agreed and dismissed the post-conviction action. This
Court reversed, holding that § 78-12-31.1 was unconstitutional
under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.

Curriey v.

Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993).
Back in the trial court, the State again sought dismissal
of Mr. Currier's Petition, this time on the grounds that he should
have raised his claims on direct appeal and that it failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.

(R. 130). On June 24,

1994, the district court granted the State's Motion to Dismiss,
ruling that "all of the grounds now asserted by petitioner were
known to him before he dismissed his appeal."

3

See Currier v. Holdenf

According to the

862 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App.

1993).
5

court, Mr. Currier's dismissal of his appeal "against the advice of
his counsel"4 had relinquished the claims raised in the Petition.
(R. 260-61).
Mr. Currier sought reconsideration, arguing that his claims
were not barred because the lawyer who had provided ineffective
assistance continued to represent him on direct appeal.

(R. 263).

In denying the Request for Reconsideration on July 6, 1994, the
court concluded

that the

ineffective

assistance

claims were

virtually identical to the claim that Mr. Currier's plea was
involuntary and had been abandoned.

(R. 271). Moreover, the fact

that trial and appellate counsel were the same did not excuse the
failure to raise ineffective assistance issues in the direct
appeal. According to the court, due to trial counsel's "remarkable
candor," "[t]here can be no question that, had petitioner proceeded
with his appeal, that question would have been recognized and
addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals."
Notice

of

Appeal

from

this

(R. 272).

second

dismissal

of Mr.

Currier's Rule 65B petition was timely filed on July 20, 1994.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE MR. CURRIER WAS REPRESENTED IN HIS DIRECT
APPEAL BY THE SAME LAWYER WHO ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
EXIST TO EXCUSE THE FAILURE TO RAISE HIS POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS ON APPEAL.

4

Although the Affidavit submitted with the Motion to Dismiss
the appeal had stated that counsel advised against the dismissal,
Mr. Currier alleged in the Rule 65B Petition that trial counsel
"told petitioner to sign an [sic] plea agreement to drop the appeal
and not sue anyone including himself, and his counsel would get him
released from the Carbon County Jail, (R. 5 ) .
6

The State correctly sets forth the law generally applicable
to complaints that a post-conviction petition under Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is procedurally barred.

However,

both the State and the court below disregard controlling Utah law
which establishes that unusual circumstances in this case exist to
allow consideration of Mr. Currier's claims despite the fact that
they were not raised on direct appeal.
Although the failure to include known issues in an appeal
ordinarily bars their litigation in a post-conviction petition, the
Utah Supreme Court "has frequently addressed and resolved the
merits of claims asserted in petitions for writs of habeas corpus
even though the issues raised were known or should have been known
at the time of conviction or initial appeal." jjupst v. Cookr 777
P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989).

A court may consider a claim raised

for the first time in post-conviction if unusual circumstances
excuse the failure to argue the issue on direct appeal. Fernandez
v. Cookr 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989).
The situation in Mr. Currier's case —

the allegedly

incompetent counsel handled the trial and the direct appeal —

is

the most common one in which the unusual circumstances test is
satisfied.5

In fact, "When trial counsel represents the defendant

on appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because

5

Mr. Currier's claim that incriminating statements have
been recanted is another type of unusual circumstance.
The
discovery of new exculpatory evidence can be litigated in Rule 65B
proceedings although not addressed on appeal. Hurst v. Cookf 777
P.2d at 1035, n.6; Stewart v. State By and Through DeLandf 830 P.2d
306, 309 (Utah App. 1992).
7

it is 'unreasonable to expect trial counsel to raise the issue of
his own ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'"

{State v^

Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 907 (Utah App. 1994) (Emphasis added).
also,

See

State v. Humphriesf 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
In attempting to avoid these rules, the State relies on the

district court's unwarranted speculation that trial counsel here
was so remarkably candid that he would have asserted his own
inadequacy to allow the Court to reach the ineffective assistance
issue on appeal.

(Brief of Appellee, at 13; R.272).

This line of

conjecture is similar to that rejected by the Utah Supreme Court
majority in Fernandez v. Cook, where the court said "the fact that
we might have considered the claim on appeal from the resentencing
cannot foreclose [petitioner] from pursuing a procedurally correct
course, habeas corpus." 783 P.2d at 549, n.3 (Emphasis added).
Assuming, arguendo,
evade

the

bright-line

that mere speculation can be used to
exceptional

circumstances

exemption

articulated in ferpandezf this case is not an appropriate one for
its application.

Currier v. Holden.

Here, the assumption that

trial counsel would have raised his own ineffective assistance is
rebutted by the record.

The district court and the State focused

on the fact that trial counsel had admitted to the trial judge and
in the Docketing Statement, that he pressured Mr. Currier into
pleading guilty.

However, these admissions in open court fell

short of asserting that counsel provided ineffective assistance,
and they became much more tentative in the Docketing Statement.

8

On January 3, 1989, trial counsel stated on the record that
undue and wrongful pressure he exerted had induced Mr. Currier to
enter the pleaf and that "I should not have indicated to him or so
advised him."

(R. 229). On April 3, 1989, counsel stated that he

urged Mr. Currier to plead guilty based on an inaccurate prediction
of the probation department's position on sentencing and that he
should not have advised him to sign the plea agreement.

(R. 22,

23).

In the Docketing Statement, counsel phrased the problem this

way:

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the plea

withdrawal "when counsel for Defendant indicated that perhaps too
much pressure had been applied to Defendant to encourage him to
enter the guilty plea"?

(R. 47) (Emphasis added)

Significantly, trial counsel did not ever suggest that his
representation might have been constitutionally deficient because
he failed to investigate the case before the plea or because he
represented the co-defendant.

Further, although the appeal was

pending for two months, counsel did not take the opportunity to
seek substitution of counsel.

Nor is it clear that substitution

would have been ordered if trial counsel had brought the matter to
the Court's attention,

gee ^abpumf 881 P.2d at 907, n.10.

Alternatively, the State also contends that the failure to
raise his claims on appeal is not attributable to the fact that
trial counsel continued to represent him in this Court, but to the
fact that Mr. Currier dismissed the appeal.

The State, and the

court below, have failed to recognized a factual question which is

9

crucial to this contention and which demonstrates the fundamental
flaw in dismissing Mr. Currier's Petition without taking evidence.
Relying on an Affidavit executed on June 21, 1989, the
State claims that the dismissal of Mr. Currier's direct appeal
occurred against the advice of counsel.
12).

(Brief of Appellee, at

However, in his Petition, Mr. Currier alleged in pertinent

part that:
The petitioner's counsel filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals and then told petitioner to sign
an [sic] plea agreement to drop the appeal and not
sue anyone including himself, and his counsel
would get him released from the Carbon County
Jail. Petitioner signed, the appeal was dismissed
and petitioner was released into probation.
(R. 5).

The State and the trial court have not mentioned this

factual conflict, which can only be resolved after an evidentiary
hearing.

Other facts show that the circumstances surrounding the

dismissal of the direct appeal were extremely unusual —

Mr.

Currier was not represented by independent counsel, but by the
lawyer claimed to be ineffective; Mr. Currier was required to
relinquish his right to sue the county and the State in order to
receive the early release; and no attempt was made to seek his
release from jail through other means, such as a stay pending
appeal or an appeal bond.
When the dismissal or omission of an appellate issue has
occurred as a result of counsel's actions, or inaction, the
defendant's claim has not been waived. Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d
619, 621 (Utah 1989); Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App.
1988); Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
10

As these cases

have held, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate to resolve the
factual conflict here and determine what actually happened when Mr.
Currier's appeal was dismissed.
Finally, the State argues that Mr. Currier's ineffective
assistance claim is identical to the claim raised in his attempts
to withdraw his guilty plea, and therefore was specifically
discarded when his direct appeal was dismissed.
State, and to the district court,
new label on old facts."

According to the

"Petitioner has simply placed a

(Brief of Appellee, at 12; see R.271).

The belief that the two claims are identical is incorrect—
the ineffective assistance claim is based on an entirely different
legal theory and on additional facts. For instance, in addition to
claiming that trial counsel improperly pressured him into pleading
guilty, Mr. Currier alleges that trial counsel did not conduct an
adequate investigation and that the dual representation of codefendant Raymond Marquez created an unconstitutional conflict of
interest.

(R. 4). Moreover, the legal bases for the two claims

are distinct.

Cff r State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293 (Utah 1992)

(Court separately treats claim that plea was involuntary because
the defendant didn't understand the elements of the offense and
claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to
investigate and discuss potential defenses with the defendant).
Mr. Currier seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of
claims that could not have been raised on appeal, because he was
represented by constitutionally ineffective counsel.

Exceptional

circumstances exist to allow their litigation on the merits, and
11

the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Currier's Rule 65B
Petition.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO AFFIRM THE PETITION'S
DISMISSAL ON A GROUND NOT DECIDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT AND NOT BASED ON A CORRECT ANALYSIS OF
SUBSTANTIVE LAW.
Although the district court did not address the issue, the

State contends that Mr. Currier's Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Post-conviction Relief failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and urges this Court to affirm its
dismissal.

Because the court below declined to reach the issue,

this Court should as well. Moreover, the State's argument rests on
the

erroneous

analysis

of

the

law

controlling

two

crucial

substantive issues.
First, the State argues that Mr. Currier is not entitled to
relief because the trial court decided that his guilty plea was
voluntary when it refused to allow withdrawal of the plea in 1989.
The State mischaracterizes this argument as one asserting the
defense of failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; in essence the State's contention
actually is that a defendant cannot challenge a guilty plea once
the district court has ruled that it was voluntarily entered. This
contention is clearly incorrect.

Adopting it would effectively

insulate trial court rulings from post-conviction review although
they are cognizable under Rule 65B as violations of the accused's
constitutional rights.

Further, the trial court's decision here

that the plea was voluntary did not rest on full and fair
litigation of the issue.

No evidence was presented at the brief
12

hearing on January 3, 1989; trial counsel merely addressed a few
comments to the court.

When the issue was raised again prior to

sentencing, the trial court noted that counsel had not offered any
supporting evidence and then denied counsel's belated request for
more time. Indeed, counsel's handling of Mr. Currier's request for
a plea withdrawal is another instance of ineffective assistance
justifying consideration of the Rule 65B Petition on its merits.
Second, the State contends that Mr. Currier's pro

se

Petition does not state a claim because it does not satisfy the
test

for

ineffective

assistance

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

claims

under

Strickland

y.

As applied to a guilty plea, the

Strickland test requires a showing that counsel's actions and
advice were not objectively

competent

and

that

"there

is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Hill

Vt I^opkh^rt, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

Apporfl, MQQre v. , United

States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); Osborn v. ghjllinger, 861
F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); Persons? V, Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525
(Utah 1994). A "reasonable probability" is one which is sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome; however, it is not outcomedeterminative or equivalent to the preponderance standard of proof.
Osborn, 871 F.2d at 626.
In

asserting

that

Mr. Currier

failed

to

allege

the

prejudice prong of the Strickland ineffective assistance test, the
State applies an overly restrictive interpretation of Hill v.
Lockhart by requiring defendants to plead the exact words, "I would
13

not have pleaded guilty" if counsel had been adequate.

The Court

should not accept this narrow reading of the prejudice requirement,
because it is not mandated by Hill and because it is unduly harsh
when applied to Utah inmates who must draft Rule 65B petitions on
their own, without legal training or access to necessary resources.
Rule 65b is based on the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
which was designed to liberalize state post-conviction proceedings
and

make

them

"flexible

enough

so

that

with

sympathetic

consideration of pleadings and methods of presenting issues, a
prisoner will always be able to raise his claims in a state court."
ffurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d at 1034 (quoting Annotation, yniform PostConviction Ac1; 11 Unif.L.Ann. 477, 482 (1974)).6

With this in

mind, the instant Petition should be compared to that in Hill.
In Hill, the defendant claimed that counsel had incorrectly
advised him about his parole eligibility and sought a reduction in
his sentence to produce a parole eligibility date in line with that
advice.

474 U.S. at

54-55. The Supreme Court's inquiry was not

simply whether the petition included the talismanic statement that
the defendant would have pleaded not guilty

if he had been

correctly advised about his parole eligibility. Rather, the Court
also

analyzed

whether

the

petition

"alleged

[any]

special

circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed
particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether
* As Chief Justice Zimmerman recognized in Parsons v. Barnes,
it defies logic to expect uncounseled and untrained prisoners to
strictly comply with the complex legal doctrines involved in
postconviction litigation. 871 P.2d at 530-31 (Zimmerman, C.J.,
concurring)
14

or not to plead guilty."

474 U.S. at 60. The Court additionally

noted that the incorrect advice from counsel applied to his
sentence after a conviction at trial as well as to his sentence
under the plea agreement. 474 U.S at 60. Similarly, in Pjtysons v.
games f of significance to the Utah Supreme Court were the facts
that the defendant had admitted his guilt from the beginning, had
not presented any evidence that he ever intended to go to trial and
had not sought to withdraw his plea.

871 P.2d at 525.

In the instant case, an allegation of prejudice can easily
be inferred in Mr. Currier's Petition, which includes the following
assertions:

"counsel used undue and wrongful pressure to have

petitioner into a plea agreement and plead guilty to the charges"
(R. 3); "Petitioner told counsel that he could not plead guilty to
something he did not do," (R. 4); and

"Petitioner finally had no

choice but to accept the alleged plea agreement," (R. 4).

Mr.

Currier continues to assert that he is innocent of the offense to
which he pleaded guilty.

This case should be remanded with

instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing at which Mr. Currier
would have the opportunity to present evidence demonstrating a
reasonable probability that he would have pleaded not guilty.
In any event, the State does not argue that another Sixth
Amendment claim is inadequate under Rule 12(b)(6). Both the State
and the district court have ignored the issue, although Mr.
Currier's Petition includes the claim that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance because he had a conflict of interest in
representing both Mr. Currier and his co-defendant. This claim is
15

independent of that based on counsel's deficient performance, and
is founded on the fundamental principle that:
The
right
to
counsel
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution contemplates the services of an
attorney devoted solely to the interests of his
client .... and faithful, devoted service to a
client are prized traditions of the American
lawyers. It is this kind of service for which the
Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is
this service deemed more honorable than in case of
appointment to represent an accused too poor to
hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a
member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be
charged with an offense which is particularly
abhorrent.
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948).

Accord, e.g.,

Osborn v. Shi1linger, 861 F.2d at 624-25; State v. Holland, 876
P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994).
A conflict of interest claim is analyzed differently from
that of ineffective assistance due to deficient performance.
Osborn v. Shi1linger, 861 F.2d at 625. Significantly, a defendant
who

shows that his

counsel

actively

represented

conflicting

interests need not demonstrate prejudice, but prejudice will be
presumed.

Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 349-50

(1980).

Accord, e.g., United States v. Martin, 965 F.2d 839, 842 (10th Cir.
1992); Osborn, 861 F.2d at 627.

Both the State and the district

court have ignored this claim, yet it provides an independent basis
for post-conviction relief which must be explored at an evidentiary
hearing.
III.

CONSIDERATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH
RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS PREMATURE, BECAUSE THE DISMISSALS OF
HIS PETITION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS HAVE PREVENTED
A FULL PRESENTATION OF MR. CURRIER'S POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS.
16

The State interprets the Brief of Appellant as including an
argument that post-conviction relief should be granted because the
trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure in accepting Mr. Currier's guilty plea. (Brief
of Appellee, at 9-11).

The State contends that the Court should

decline to reach this claim, and, alternatively, that Mr. Currier
is not entitled to relief on the merits.
Mr. Currier agrees that the Court should not address the
merits of the Rule 11 issue. The post-conviction court explicitly
did not decide the claim.

(R. 260). The Brief of Appellant did

not argue the merits of the claim; the State apparently has
misinterpreted a sentence in its Statement of the Case, (Brief of
Appellant, at
Undersigned

3 ) , as

asserting

counsel did not

an

intend

argument

on

the merits.

for this sentence to be

interpreted in this manner.
Resolution of the merits of the Rule 11 issue is premature.
Instead, this case should be remanded to the district court, where
Mr. Currier's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Relief could be supplemented with the assistance of
undersigned counsel to include a more specific statement of his
claims.

Mr. Currier then would have the opportunity to present

evidence to support the factual allegations in his Petition. Only
then, with an adequate record,

would review of the merits of the

claim be appropriate.
IV.

SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS
INAPPROPRIATE AND WOULD UNFAIRLY PUNISH MR. CURRIER FOR
COUNSEL'S INADVERTENT ERROR.
17

The State also has asked this Court to affirm the denial of
Mr. Currier's Petition because the Opening Brief did not include
citations to the record, as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah
Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure.

(Brief

of

Appellee,

at 8).

Undersigned counsel acknowledges that the Brief of Appellant failed
to comply with Rule 24(a)(7); his error has been corrected by
including a complete Statement of the case in this Reply Brief.
Counsel apologizes to the Court and to counsel for the State for
any inconvenience caused by his mistake.
The

Court

summarily affirm.

should

decline

the

State's

invitation

to

Summary affirmance is not a mandatory response

to noncompliance with Rule 24(a)(7); appellate courts merely have
the discretion to affirm.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.f

818 P.2d 1311, 1313, n.l (Utah App. 1991).
not be exercised

That discretion should

in the instant case, because the citations

contained in the Brief of Appellee and in this Reply Brief are
sufficient for this Court's review.

Further, Rule 2 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes suspension of the rules in
the

interests

of

justice.

Here,

summarily

affirming

would

irreparably punish Mr. Currier for a procedural error attributable
solely to counsel and not to him personally.

Mr. Currier,

throughout the history of this case, including his previous appeal,
has been forced to rely on volunteer pro bono counsel.

Moreover,

the State suffers no prejudice from consideration of this appeal on
its merits.
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CONCLUSION
Clear error occurred when the district court ruled

that

exceptional circumstances do not exist and that Mr. Currier's postconviction claims are barred by the failure to raise them during
the direct appeal in which he was represented by the same lawyer
alleged to have provided ineffective assistance.

This Court must

reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of Mr. Currier's
Rule 65b Petition.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Petitioner-Appellee Stephen Currier requests oral argument
of this matter.

This request is supported by the facts that Mr.

Currier is sentenced to a term of up to 15 years in the Utah State
Prison, that he has tried unsuccessfully for more than four years
just to have his constitutional claims considered on the merits,
and

that

the

district

court

has

misinterpreted

controlling

authority clearly allowing his Rule 65B Petition to be litigated.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1995.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW [3768]
JEFFREY H. HAGEN [6395]
10 West 300 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys
Appellant
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for

Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I served a copy of this Reply Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant upon counsel for the Respondent-Appellee, by
placing the same in the United States Mail, First Class postage
prepaid

and

addressed

to Angela

Micklos, Assistant

General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
day of April, 1995.
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